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The days of the Labour Government were numbered from 
the moment the referendum result was declared in the counting 
centre at New St Andrews House, headquarters of the Govern-
ment's devolved administrative machine in Scotland, in the late 
afternoon of March 2. Mr Bruce Millan, the Secretary of State 
for Scotland, looking tired and dejected, promised at a hastily 
arranged news conference that the Cabinet would closely study 
the outcome before reaching a decision. But in his heart he 
must have known that the Government's battle for short-term 
survival, since the ending of the Lib-Lab pact, had been lost; 
that there was little chance of whipping Labour backbenchers 
into line, even if the Government favoured such precipitate 
action. 
The Scottish National Party, for a change, was relatively 
united on the tactics to adopt in Parliament the following week: 
a firm commitment from the Government to act speedily on 
the close-run "Yes" result, by imposing a three-line Whip on 
Labour MPs ... or else. When, almost three weeks later, Mr 
Callaghan rose to make his long-delayed announcement on the 
future of the Scotland Act, followed by a special television 
broadcast to explain the Government's motives - surely one of 
his least impressive, and unconvincing performances? - there 
were those both in the parliamentary Labour Party and outside 
who thought the eleven SNP MPs were bluffing. In some 
quarters there were rumours that the group was sufficiently 
split to guarantee the Government's survival in any confidence 
vote. But, in the words of one moderate Nationalist member 
who has often differed with his colleagues over tactics and 
ideology: "Everyone by then was bloody weary - they had 
a couldn't-care-less attitude and didn't want to prolong the agony 
any longer." 
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Mr Callaghan's offer of bilateral talks, to determine 
"whether a measure of agreement might not be found to provide 
for the better government of Scotland", cut little ice. Mr Donald 
Stewart accused him of treating the Scots with contempt and 
promptly slapped down a no confidence motion, although some 
leading members of his party back home - notably Mrs Margo 
MacDonald and Professor Neil MacCormick - did appear to 
express doubts about the parliamentary's group's tactics. The 
Tories then jumped in behind the SNP to table the official 
opposition motion. 
At the end of the crucial debate, six day later on March 28, 
the SNP MPs proudly proclaimed that, for the first time, a 
Government had been brought down on a Scottish issue by 
a group of Scottish MPs who were not prepared to see their 
country betrayed by Westminster yet again. Nevertheless, several 
SNP members- notably Mr George Reid and Mr Hamish Watt, 
who had recently rebelled twice against the group - did 
apparently have some reservations about the timing of the 
exercise. 
The MPs, while bracing themselves for a setback, still 
expected to remain a reasonably influential force after the Elec-
tion. They were genuinely undismayed by recent opinion poll 
findings, which put Nationalist support at less than 20% and 
falling, pointing out that in the two elections of 1974 SNP 
standing was consistently underestimated by around 10%. The 
predictions of Labour's Mr Willie Hamilton during the no 
cpnfidence debate that "the SNP will soon be able to get their 
MPs into a single taxi, if not on a bike", were laughed out 
of the Palace of Westminster. As it turned out, a tandem would 
have been quite handy. 
Although the campaign proper was still two weeks away, 
the gloves came off only hours after the Government defeat 
- by one vote - in a heated Radio Scotland discussion. Mr 
Millan, annoyed and somewhat puzzled by the Nationalist tactics, 
labelled the SNP - rather appropriately - the "suicide squad". 
Mr Donald Stewart, then leader of the parliamentary party, 
calmly puffed his pipe and maintained that the Scots were 
seething with indignation over Labour's "refusal" to honour 
its manifesto commitment. The SNP slogan, repeated time and 
again during the campaign - "we wuz robbed" - was already 
wearing thin. After all, how could the Nats expect to convince 
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voters that Labour was not to be trusted when they, not the 
Government, had effectively killed the Act by rejecting Mr 
Callaghan's offer of talks on the future of the legislation. Not 
surprisingly, there are now those in the SNP who think the 
party could have salvaged rather more from the Election, dis-
played a more credible image, had the MPs given the Govern-
ment the benefit of the doubt - "a longer rope to hang 
themselves on", as Mrs MacDonald might have put it. 
Of course, the great mass of the party, instinctively luke-
warm towards devolution anyway, was quite pleased to see the 
back of the Scotland Act. At a rally on Edinburgh's Calton 
Hill, high above the splendid Royal High School that had been 
renovated to provide a home for the Assembly, only two-hundred 
activists turned up for what was billed as a major pre-campaign 
rally, the weekend after the Commons vote, under the slogan 
"Scotland Said Yes on March 1". A couple of years ago several 
thousand could have been expected. After a short time, it broke 
up in disarray as a more belligerent faction chanting "indepen-
dence - nothing less" paraded down Princes Street, against 
police advice, to the embarrassment of more moderate elements. 
There was the odd scuffle and a couple of arrests. 
Right at the start of campaigning it seemed that the subject 
which had topped the political agenda in Scotland for the last 
twelve years or so was destined to become the great non-issue 
in the Election, relegated to the bottom of the priority league 
by the overriding all-British issues - prices, jobs, the economy 
- which were to dominate the campaign. Perhaps there was 
some faint home-rule passion lingering in the subconscious, 
but as the Glasgow Herald reported in one of its regular System 
Three polls shortly before the Election, only 3% of those 
questioned put devolution as a key issue. It fell behind the 
power of the unions (4%) while law and order- to the amaze-
ment of Teddy Taylor - attracted only 8%. Right at the top 
were jobs and employment (28%) and the cost of living -
predictably - with 47%. 
Nevertheless, from the outset all the main British parties, 
for the first time, were determined to inject a noticeable Scottish 
dimension into the campaign with separ~te manifestos - differ-
ing in varying degrees from the main documents- and separate 
policies in certain areas. Until 1974, when the SNP shook the 
British Constitution to its foundations, the two main parties 
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did not see the need to campaign on a Scottish manifesto 
(although the Scottish Liberals, devolved from their London 
machine under a quaintly Liberal federal structure, have in-
variably gone their own way to some extent). 
Labour experimented with a modest document in February 
1974, then with a much bolder manifesto the following October, 
positively radical in tone compared with its successor last April. 
No mention, this time, of an irreversible shift in the balance 
of power in favour of working people and their families. The 
Tories, on the other hand, published a short, typewritten "Char-
ter for Scotland" in October 1974. It was unimpressive in design, 
but near heretical in content by today's Tory standards: separate 
Scottish budget, oil fund, legislative Assembly, and generally 
much stronger on the Home-Rule front than Labour's com-
mitment for an Assembly with substantial powers over the 
"crucial areas of decision-making". 
This time both main parties were noticeably cooler on the 
subject. Labour naturally retained its commitment to devolu-
tion, although several prominent members of the Scottish party 
had been urging the Scottish executive to ditch its support for 
the Scotland Act at Labour's Scottish conference the previous 
month in Perth. But there was no mention this time of "crucial 
areas of decision-making", although Mr Millan claimed at a 
news conference to launch the manifesto that such a commit-
ment still stood. 
The Tories, after successfully mobilising much of the "No" 
lobby in the referendum campaign - and converting others with 
a little help from Lord Home ("vote no for a better act") -
could afford to be vague. No wild talk about an Assembly this 
time, only a pledge to repeal the much-maligned Scotland Act 
because "fewer than one in three people" supported the Govern-
ment's proposals. Perhaps so, but still a considerably higher 
level of support than the Conservatives achieved in Scotland 
on May 3. 
Then there was, predictably, more waffle about the need for 
an all-party conference - the classic get-out from them -
to see if improvements could be reached in the system of govern-
ment: "We aim to bring government closer to the people 
and allow more decisions affecting Scotland to be made in 
Scotland." No one, least of all the party hierarchy, seemed 
quite sure what this meant although Mr Teddy Taylor, as the 
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Tories' chief Scottish spokesman, had privately canvassed the 
idea of bringing the Scottish Grand Committee from Westminster 
to Edinburgh (presumably with a suitable weighting of English 
MPs to reflect the party balance at Westminster) and televising 
its sittings. 
Labour, like the Conservatives, did not rate devolution 
as a top priority: the former placed much emphasis this time 
not on creating "more and better jobs in Scotland", but on 
saving existing jobs; the latter. as in England, was largely pre-
occupied with cutting income tax, law and order - that is, 
setting up anti-vandal squads, reviewing the working of children's 
panels, etc. - selling council houses and reforming trade unions. 
Yet, unlike the party south of the border, Labour effectively 
managed to set the tone of the campaign from day one, to drive 
the Tories into a corner from which they found it difficult to 
escape. The only way out for them, it seemed, was compromise, 
and by the end of the campaign the seemingly aggressive Tory 
industrial policy had been considerably tempered north of the 
border. "Forget what Sir Keith Joseph and his allies are saying 
-we'll be much different in power up here", they were implying 
at the end of Press conferences. 
Mr Callaghan began the assault in his opening speech to 
3,000 supporters in Glasgow's Apollo Centre on 9 April. (He 
warned that Scotland could become an industrial desert - more 
and more jobs at risk - if the Tories practised what they were 
preaching. Mr Millan, two days later, elaborated. "We take the 
very simple view that we shall save jobs wherever we can," he 
said. "The Tories, as I understand it, are fighting this election 
on the basis that where jobs are uneconomic and profits are 
not being made the Government should stand back ... ". 
The following week Mr Millan drove the message home 
further as the Tories desperately searched for a new initiative 
to counter this onslaught: there was not a single industrial 
project in Scotland, he said, that did not depend on Government 
support of one form or another. As if to underline this point, 
he then persuaded the Secretary of State for Industry, Mr Eric 
Varley, to keep open two plants run by Prestcold Refrigeration 
(a subsidiary of British Leyland employing almost 1,000 on the 
doorstep of his Glasgow constituency) which the parent company 
wanted to close, pending an investigation by the National Enter-
prise Board. The Government, he said, would foot the bill to 
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keep the factories open in the meantime. Mr Teddy Taylor, 
fighting for his political life in a predominantly working-class 
seat, naturally found it extremely difficult to condemn the 
exercise, although Sir Keith Joseph was more forthright; "a 
shabby political manoeuvre", he thought. 
Labour had more ammunition in its armoury. What was 
the Tory attitude towards the Scottish Development Agency, 
created by the Wilson Government with the awesome task of 
regenerating the Scottish economy? Mr Denis Healey, visiting 
East Dumbartonshire - then Britain's most marginal seat with 
a majority of twenty-two - claimed the Tories would cripple 
the agency, then litter Scotland with bankrupt firms. In fact 
Conservatives. although hostile to the concept of the Agency, 
had only promised to issue it with new guidelines to ensure 
that investment was channelled towards assisting industries with 
a "viable" long-term future - exactly what the Agency had 
been trying to do anyway. No doubt aware that she had to 
counter the Labour onslaught before it got out of hand, Mrs 
Thatcher, at a subsequent news conference in Glasgow, was 
rather more explicit: the Agency, she said, had a tremendous 
advantage over its big brother - the National Enterprise Board 
- because it had to open its books to the House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee. Then in her first speech since 
assuming office, the week after the election at a truncated 
Scottish Tory conference in Perth, the new Prime Minister 
actually accepted that investment through the SDA was necessary 
- in the short term at least - to plug an equity gap for venture 
capital which private institutions were unable to fill. With some 
justification, Labour claimed afterwards that its vigorous cam-
paign had at least educated Mrs Thatcher in the economic facts 
of life in Scotland. 
Meanwhile the Scottish National Party, which had become 
used to forcing both main British parties onto the defensive 
over the previous five years, found that it was actually being 
pushed onto the periphery of the campaign - squeezed out, 
as frustrated party leaders finally conceded - as Labour and 
the Tories slogged it out on the economic front. Ruefully they 
remembered Callaghan's jibe on 28 March that if the SNP 
voted for the no confidence motion "it would be the first time 
turkeys had voted for an early Christmas". Indeed, there were 
times when the SNP almost seemed an irrelevance, which just 
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goes to prove that when the tide is running against a party no 
amount of publicity can put it back on course. Party election 
funds had been swelled by two sizeable bequests. Tens of 
thousands of pounds were spent on a series of advertising hoard-
ings, SNP election broadcasts were snappy, even impressive on 
occasions. But the advertising was often long-winded, indigestible 
and certainly not eye-catching. And, of course, there was little 
or no mention of independence. The message, simply, was that 
the SNP had put Scotland at the centre of the Westminster 
stage - and wouldn't the electors be foolish to throw all that 
away by reinforcing the tired, discredited, two-party system. 
Well, they did. 
SNP election addresses were often uncharacteristically de-
fensive, pointing out that the party was pro-NATO, pro-Queen 
and pro-Commonwealth, in favour of an association of British 
states, for a mixed economy and the status quo and certainly 
against customs posts at Gretna Green and Berwick upon Tweed. 
Mr Douglas Crawford, defending Perth and East Perthshire, 
even managed to dig out a photograph of himself shaking hands 
with the Queen during her jubilee visit to the constituency. 
The Nationalist campaign really got off to a disastrous 
start. Mr Willy Wolfe, the retiring chairman, was forced to 
take the opening Press conference in Glasgow single-handed. 
Party officials, at times, found it difficult to hide their embar-
rassment at the absence of some of the former MPs. Suddenly, 
rather pathetically, the SNP was portrayed as a crankish party, 
on the fringe of politics, which was not to be taken too seriously. 
"If I was watching them for the first time I would dismiss them 
as a bit of a joke," remarked one seasoned observer despair-
ingly afterwards. 
Valuable television time had been wasted by the party 
leader's uninspiring performance. In the final week of the cam-
paign the SNP attempted to repair the damage by persuading 
Mr Donald Stewart to venture into the Glasgow conurbation 
for a brief visit from his Western Isles outpost. He reckoned 
the pundits had it all wrong, and that the party would do con-
siderably better than the opinion polls suggested. Few took him 
seriously, although the scale of the party's collapse exceeded 
the most pessimistic forecasts. 
By the end of the campaign, both main parties could afford 
virtually to ignore the Nationalists although Mrs Thatcher made 
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a token visit around North-east Scotland to rally the Tory troops 
in the region where the SNP made its most significant break-
through in 1974. At a preceding rally in Edinburgh, she re-
peated that the Tories would never lumber the Scots with what 
she called "fresh and costly layers of bureaucracy". As for 
constitutional change: "The devolution in which we believe 
above all is the devolution of power from politicians and the 
state to the people themselves." When Mrs Thatcher glanced at 
The Scotsman that same day, she no doubt noticed the findings 
of an Opinion Research Centre poll. It showed that since the 
referendum, support for scrapping the Assembly had declined; 
two-thirds of those questioned said they would back moves to 
either improve the Scotland Act, or find an alternative for it. 
Ah well. 
Then, six days before the Election, the Tories produced 
what they hoped would be their trump card: a Labour convert 
- well, he actually hadn't been a party member for some time 
- in the shape of Lord Wilson of Langside, one time Solicitor 
General for Scotland, who had been sitting in the Lords as a 
crossbencher. He had been joint chairman of the wealthy Scot-
land Says No group during the referendum campaign. Mr Teddy 
Taylor could not hide his excitement, on a Press conference 
platform, when he introduced Lord Wilson as the latest in a 
long line of Labour Ministers who had been forced out of the 
party by the Left. In fact, when questioned, Lord Wilson 
stressed that he would not be joining the Tories, only working 
for them for the first time. He admitted at one stage that he 
had no real objection to the Labour manifesto. Indeed, he 
conceded that the 1945 manifesto, on which he originally cam-
paigned, was a far more radical document. But, said Lord 
Wilson, times had changed since then. 
However, this ingenious little public relations exercise did 
not seem to benefit the Tories greatly. As expected, they picked 
up seven seats from the Nationalists, by slender majorities, but 
failed to make any great impact in the areas that mattered: 
the industrial heartlands of West Central Scotland, where the 
Tories were so (relatively) strong in the mid-50s. Their share 
of the vote rose from 24.7% to 31.3%, almost entirely at the 
expense of the SNP. Writing in The Daily Telegraph the fol-
lowing week, Mr Teddy Taylor - who lost Cathcart because 
Labour, for the first time, managed to pull out their vote in 
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the hugh Castlemilk scheme, and put against him John Maxton, 
nephew of the legendary Jimmy Maxton, leader of the ILP in 
Scotland - said the Tories would only become acceptable again 
in the West when they were judged by their deeds, not their 
words: 
"The inherent suspicion of Conservative policy . . . can in my 
view, only be overturned by a Conservative Government in 
action showing that its policies of enterprise and incentives 
can help to create the new secure enterprises and jobs which 
Labour policies have so singularly failed to bring about." 
Liberals, who were surprisingly the only party to campaign 
on an ecological theme - they called for restrictions on nuclear 
power and on private cars in cities - increased their vote 
slightly from 8.3% to 8.5%. Like the SNP (down from 30.4% 
to 17.2%) they found it impossible to convert thousands of 
newcomers in North-east Scotland- where they had high hopes 
of taking West Aberdeenshire from the Tories- to their cause. 
Labour (up from 36.2% to 41.8%) was naturally pleased, 
but certainly not overjoyed with its performance. It gained 
three seats - two from the SNP - to give the party exactly 
double the Tory number of twenty-two. But party officials are 
convinced they could have done even better had Mr Callaghan 
gone to the country the previous autumn, when Labour did 
particularly well in the Berwick and East Lothian by-election. 
The tiny, breakaway Scottish Labour Party, as expected, 
was all but obliterated although Mr Jim Sillars, its founder, while 
losing his seat, polled more than 12,000 votes in South Ayrshire. 
Afterwards, he came close to conceding, in a Scottish Television 
interview, that the whole exercise, in retrospect, might be con-
sidered questionable. "An historical mistake?" asked the 
interviewer, Colin Mackay. "Oh, that's possible," replied a sur-
prisingly cheery Mr Sillars, who said he was now finished with 
politics. "Time alone will tell." Mr George Reid, the ex-
television journalist who masterminded the SNP's election 
broadcasts, was also reflective. Sad, he thought, that Scotland 
would not now be getting a fair share of her resources. Then, 
in apparent disillusionment, he called for a new political 
initiative by supporters of Home Rule. Time, perhaps, for a 
new "third force" in Scottish politics? 
The problem for the Conservatives was how to govern 
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Scotland when they were so far behind Labour, although the 
Tories would undoubtedly have been seen in a more favourable 
light under a system of proportional representation. Even then, 
however, they would probably still have been eight seats behind 
Labour, whose representation could have been cut from forty-
four to thirty. Mr George Younger, the new Secretary of State 
for Scotland, was undismayed, although mildly conciliatory on 
the social and economic front. There had been several times 
in the past, he recalled, when Labour had come to power 
nationally solely on the basis of its strength in Scotland - and 
the English hadn't complained then. 
But, as the normally moderate Mr Donald Dewar implied 
in an untypically hard-line speech in his Glasgow Garscadden 
constituency a couple of weeks afterwards, there would be a 
limit to the patience of a Labour-dominated Scotland over the 
next year or so as a Thatcher Government pursued policies 
against the wishes of a large number of voters. The clamour 
for some form of self-government was still strong, indeed would 
get stronger during the lifetime of the present Government, 
he thought. "It may be that many who did vote No, or who 
abstained, may come to regret the indecisive result of the 
referendum as Mrs Thatcher's shock troops ride rough-shod 
... over Scotland," he predicted. 
Perhaps Home Rule, once again, will become increasingly 
popular inside a Labour Party which, ironically, strongly re-
sisted pressure from Transport House to accept devolution in 
the first place six years ago. Sadly, this time, Labour will be 
in no position to deliver. It has had its chance. 
